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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0) and Utah R. App. P. Rules 3 and 4. Pursuant to §78-2-2(4), Utah
Code Annotated, the Utah Supreme Court transferred this matter to the Utah Court of
Appeals.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does the trial court abuse its discretion when it misapprehends the scope of the

expert witnesses' unrefuted testimonies and refuses to be guided by credible, uncontradicted

1

evidence when all other reasonable minds would accept it? Was the unrefuted expert
testimony of Butters two civil engineers in conflict?
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to admit expert testimony is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Patev v. Lainhart 1999 UT 31, t 33, 977 P.2d 1193; The court's
prerogative, of course, does not go so far as to permit it to stubbornly ignore and refuse to be
guided by credible, uncontradicted evidence when all reasonable minds would accept it. That
could result in arbitrary and unreasoning denial or distortion of justice. De Vas v. Noble. 369
P.2d 290,13 Utah 2d 133, (Utah 1962).
Citation to Record Where Issue Preserved: Notice of Appeal. (Record 919 - 922)\
Appellant's Docketing Statement.
2.

Is a monetary "offer ofjudgment" which addresses only part of the claims before

the trial court, and leaves unresolved all of the counterclaims and attorney fees, less favorable
or more favorable than a judgment of foreclosure which resolved all claims in the pending
litigation?
Standard of Review: "The interpretation of a statute [or rule of the Court] poses a
question of law which this court reviews for correctness and without deference to the lower
court's conclusions." Zoll and Branch. P. C. v. Asav. 932 P.2d 592, 593 (Utah 1997).
Citation to Record Where Issue Preserved: Motion for New Trial (Record 826- 846);
Appellant's Docketing Statement.
3.

Did the trial court err when in setting the award of attorney fees it failed to adhere

to the express language of Rule 68 limiting the effect of an Offer of Judgment to only allocation
2

of costs, particularly when such is in contravention of the Court of Appeals "prevailing party"
standard adopted in A.K. & R Whipple v. Guv. 47 P.3d 92 (Utah App. 2002)?
Standard of Review: "The interpretation of a statute [Section 38-1-18 U.C.A.] poses
a question of law which this court reviews for correctness and without deference to the lower
court's conclusions." Zoll and Branch. P. C. v. Asav. 932 P.2d 592, 593 (Utah 1997).
Citation to Record Where Issue Preserved: Motion for New Trial (Record 826- 846);
Appellant's Docketing Statement.

APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULE
Rule 68 U.R.C.P. in pertinent part provides as follows:
(b) Offer Before Trial. At any time more than 10 days before the trial
begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an
offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money or property or
to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days
after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the
offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance
together with proof of service thereof and thereupon judgment shall be
entered. An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence
thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the
judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer,
the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. The fact
that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer.
(Emphasis supplied by the Appellant)

3

§38-1-18 U.C.A. at the time of trial provided:
§ 38-1-18. Attorneys1 fees.
Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, in any action brought to
enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to
recover a reasonable attorneys1 fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be
taxed as costs in the action.
§38-1-18 U.C.A. which became effective April 30, 2001, now provides:
§ 38-1-18. Attorneys' fees—Offer of judgment.
(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in
any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party
shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to befixedby the court,
which shall be taxed as costs in the action.
(2) A person who files a wrongful lien as provided in Section 38-1-25
is not entitled to recover attorneys1 fees under Subsection (1).
(3) A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien under
this chapter may make an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. If the offer is not accepted and the judgment finally
obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree shall
pay the costs and attorneys1 fees incurred by the offeror after the offer was
made.
Amended by Laws 1961, c. 76; Laws 1995, c. 172, § 4, eff. May 1, 1995;
Laws 2001, c. 257, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal is from the judgment of the Second

District Court, Weber County, which entered a judgment and order of foreclosure of Butters'
mechanics1 lien, granted affirmative relief on Butters' bonding statute cause of action and

4

dismissed the counterclaim and third-party causes of actionfiledby the Defendants against
the Plaintiff and the Plaintiffs officers individually. The Plaintiff sought an order of
foreclosure of its mechanics' lien pursuant to the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute (§38-1-1 et
seq.) and a personal or monetary judgment against the owner of the property pursuant to the
Utah Bonding Statute (§14-2-1 et seq.). Following five (5) days of trial, the court
determined the total value of the materials, labor, and equipment the Plaintiff had provided
to Subway Sandwich property located in Farr West, Weber County, Utah, and ordered the
Plaintiffs attorney to prepare a Judgment and Order of Foreclosure and the necessary
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which were submitted to the court on May 24,
2001.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW:

On November 14, 1997, the Plaintiff, Butters Construction, filed suit seeking to
collect for the fill material, labor, and equipment it had provided to the Farr West Subway
Sandwich construction site (property) owned by the Defendant McFarlands. Butters alleged
it was entitled to protection under two theories: (1) foreclosure of the mechanics' lien it had
filed for the value of the materials, labor, and equipment it had used to enhance the property;
and (2) judgment against the property owners under the Utah Bonding Statute.
Defendants Bovee, Holgate, and McFarlands subsequentlyfiledan independent action
against Kent and Becky Butters for slander of title and interference with prospective
economic advantage. On December 2, 1998, the matters were consolidated and the

5

Defendants' claims were merged and restated into a separate counterclaim and third-party
complaint alleging six (6) causes of actions:
Count 1 - Declaratory relief that the value of the material, labor, and equipment
delivered to the property was limited to just $9,755.00;
Count 2 - Slander of title for an unspecified amount (to be proven at trial);
Count 3 - Interference with prospective economic advantage of Tim Bovee
$27,000.00;
Count 4 - Interference with prospective economic advantage of Merv Holgate
$32,000.00;
Count 5 - Judgment for all attorney fees (unspecified sum); and
Count 6 - Punitive damage claim seeking $20,000.00.
In addition, there was a counterclaim or offset for damages for negligent compaction and/or
breach of warranty due to an alleged lack of compaction. (Record 229-241)
On April 19, 1999, the Defendants submitted a monetary Offer of Judgment under
Rule 68 U.R.C.P. (Record 331-346)
On February 15, 2000, Butters Construction filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment re: Bonding Statute claims which was granted following a hearing on July 11,
2000. (Record 360-369) The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was filed to limit the
scope of the trial to the issue of the value of the material, labor, and equipment which Butters
had provided to the property. Bench trial was set and reset several times over the course of
6

the next few months each time being bumped due to a criminal matter having a higher
priority. Trial occurred over a period of five (5) days on April 25, 26, and 27, 2001, and
May 7 and 9, 2001. (Record 511- 523)
Following trial, Affidavits for Attorney Fees, Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Motions for a New Trial were filed by both parties. (Record
549, 659, 700, 725, 784, 826, and 885) On March 5,2002, the trial court held an Objection
Hearing and entered judgement granting foreclosure on April 4, 2002. (Record 725, 916
-919)
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Overview: In early November of 1996, the Plaintiff, C. E. Butters Realty and
Construction, Inc. (hereinafter "Butters Construction") was contacted to provide excavation
materials to a construction site in Fair West, Utah. The parties entered into an oral contract
which provided that the Plaintiff would be paid $95.00 per load of material delivered to the
construction site.1 A dispute arose as to the amount of material which was in fact delivered to
the site. The Defendants (property owners - McFarlands, general contractor - Holgate, and a
sub-contractor who was in charge of the excavation of the site - Bovee) refused to make any
payment (even the undisputed amount they acknowledged was due to Butters), claiming that the

1

The standard in the industry is to weigh the material at the pit and charge by the
ton. Butters had not yet moved their scale to this pit and because there was no scale
available, the parties agreed to a price based upon a truck load of material.
7

amount of materials which the Butters had invoiced was far in excess of the amount of materials
that could have possibly been delivered to the site.
In order to establish the amount of materials which were in fact delivered to the site,
discovery was undertaken and engineers (professional expert witnesses) were retained by the
Butters to establish: A) the amount of material delivered to the site was as claimed by Butters;
and, B) the material was from Butters' pit, not another source as claimed by Bovee. During the
course of trial, the expert witnesses presented their testimony which was uncontroverted by any
other expert witness. Notwithstanding, the trial court refused to give any value to the expert
witnesses (finding the two experts' testimonies conflicted with one another) and determined the
amount of material delivered to the site, along with the reasonable value of the material, and
awarded damages accordingly. The amount was far less than proven by Butters' evidence (and
by their expert witnesses).
Prior to the trial, the Defendants submitted an Offer and Judgment under Rule 68. The
Offer of Judgment referred to was specifically a monetary judgment which reserved attorney fees
and did not address at all the counterclaims and third-party claims against Butters. The judgment
which the Plaintiff eventually obtained was a judgment of foreclosure, included attorney fees,
and dismissed the counterclaims and third-party claims against Butters. During post-trial
motions, the trial court made a legal determination that the monetary Offer of Judgment (even
though it only addressed part of the litigation) was legally equivalent to the judgment of
foreclosure and order dismissing all of the Defendants' counterclaims and third-party claims.
8

Because the amount recovered was approximately $500.00 less than the Offer in Judgment (not
considering the attorney fees), the trial court allowed the Defendants to offset against the
judgment all of their costs incurred post Offer of Judgment.
The Findings and Conclusions which the Appellant believes are in resolving the appeal
are set forth below. Note: The Findings and Conclusions which are challenged are type set in
italics.
Trial Court's Findings of Facts:
1.

Plaintiff C. E. Butters Realty and Construction, Inc. ("Butters") is a Utah

corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah and is doing
business as C. E. Butters Construction, with its principal offices located in Weber County,
Utah.
2.

Butters holds both a General Engineering (El00) and General Building

Contractor's (B100) license - License No. 93-259800-5501.
3.

Kent Butters, a Third Party Defendant is the President of the Plaintiff

corporation.
4.

Becky Butters, a Third Party Defendant is an officer of the Plaintiff

corporation.
5.

The Defendants, Counterclaimants and Third-Party Plaintiffs Robert

McFarland and Renae McFarland ("McFarlands") are the owners of the property, which is

9

the subject matter of this litigation. The property is located in Fair West, Weber County,
Utah, and is described as follows:
Part of the Southwest quarter of Section 25, Township 7 North,
Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian: beginning at a point 16.4 feet
North and 885.58 feet, more or less, North 89D15' East 399.72 feet, more
or less to the West right of way line of the Southern Pacific Railroad, thence
North 19D011 West 591.07 feet, thence West 236.5 feet, thence South
0D41f 12M East 571.18 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning. Except
0.13 acre in county road (939-221).
(This property is now know as all of Lot 1 and 2, R B McFarland
Subdivision, Fan* West city, Weber County, Utah.)
6.

The Third-Party Plaintiff Mervin Holgate, d/b/a Holgate & Sons Construction

Company ("Holgate") is a licensed General building Contractor.
7.

The Defendant, Counterclaimant and Third-Party plaintiff Tim Bovee, d/b/a

Bovee Construction Company ("Bovee") is a licensed Concrete, Asphalt and Excavation
(specialty) Contractor.
8.

The McFarlands, owners of the property, entered into a written contract with

Holgate, to construct a "Subway Sandwich Shop" and a roadway to the east of the Subway
site, pursuant to certain plans and specifications for that site. This contract was entered into
on October 7,1996.
9.

Mr. Holgate, in turn, entered into a written contract with Bovee and

subcontracted a portion of the work, specifically the site work to Bovee Construction. The
site work encompassed excavation of the ground for footings for a building, preparation of
and pouring of the footings and pad on which the building sits, importation of fill, the curb
10

& gutters and other cement and asphalt work for the parking lot and a roadway adjacent to
and on the east side to the Subway Sandwich Shop. Bovee's contract encompassed
performing all of the necessary compaction requirements for the site work.
10.

Mr. Bovee testified he had a bid to import aggregate material from Parson's

Construction, but due to the time of year and the construction year end press to complete
their own projects Parsons was not in a position to fulfill that bid. As a result, Bovee was
in need of a source of supply for aggregate material because as testified to by Holgate
everyone understood that the asphalt plants would be closing around November 15th.
11.

As of the end of October and the first of November 1996, Bovee hired John

Owens with the specific instructions to locate a source of materials, the necessary equipment
and to oversee the asphalt phase of the project. John Owens was brought onto the site to
oversee all the phases for asphalt work and to make the job "asphalt ready."
12.

On or about November 4,1996, Owens contracted Butters to see if they could

supply aggregate materials to the site and also if they had equipment and men to assist in the
job as the weather was starting to turn and there would need to be a push to timely complete
the work.
13.

Owens went to Butters' gravel pit and viewed the only material that they had

available which was pit run. Butters referred to this material as natural road base material,
and John Owens understood that the material was not State Spec Road Base.
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14.

Owens was told that Butters' trucks were fully utilized on other jobs they were

trying to complete, (one was major storm clean-up for Ogden City) and as a result Butters
agreed to supply materials on a per-truckload basis as they could fit loads in between the
other projects they were committed to.
15.

Owens arranged for Butters to provide aggregate materials at the price of

$95.00 per 13 ton truckload.
16.

Butters also agreed to supply certain equipment to be charged on an hourly rate

specifically: $95.00/hour for the grader; $85.00/hour for the loader; $40.00/hour for the
compactor with an operator and $25.00/hour without an operator. Owens testified he knew
that Butters could not provide an operator for the compactor - and that he made arrangements
for his daughter's fiance to operate the compactor.
17.

Butters had no written contract with Bovee. Their obligation to the site

(supported by the testimony of Ernie Butters, Kent Butters, and John Owens) is that they did
not undertake to assume the responsibility to make the site "asphalt ready". Nor did Butters
assume the obligation to compact the materials to any specified level of compaction.
18.

John Owens was the person responsible for the compaction and he testified that

in the area where there is failure on the concrete that he graded and compacted the area.
19.

There was a dispute between the parties as to the amount of materials that

Butters delivered to the site.
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20.

The Plaintiffs presented evidence as to the amount of material, time and hours

of the equipment, the agreed rates for the various materials delivered, as well as what
reasonable rates are for this type of material and the reasonableness for the use of the
equipment that were billed to the site.
21.

The Butters' records contained numerous corrections that rendered them

unreliable.
22.

Further, no load tickets were ever provided to or made available to John Owens

or Bovee Construction until after the completion of this job.
23.

The expert testimony of two engineers presented by Butters regarding the

amount of fill imported to the site was conflicting and not helpful to the Court in determining
the number of loads delivered by Butters to the site.
24.

The best evidence of the amount of material would have been the accounting

by Butters, but since their accounting was clearly inaccurate and unreliable, the Court was
forced to adopt an alternative method of calculation.
25.

The court finds from evidence presented that the reasonable value of the

materials, equipment and labor Butters provided to the site is $17,978.74 as of the date they
left the site, which was around November 25, 1996. The number of loads of material was
calculated based on a combined analysis by Mrs. Bovee of the original bill delivered to the
Bovee and the modified time cards maintained by the Butters. Approximately 182 loads
were documented in the paperwork.

From that amount the court deducted for loads
13

delivered in a truck with a bed liner and deducted 26 loads that the court finds were not
delivered on November 16. The court finds that on average the loads delivered weighed
11.28 tons. Since the parties agreed to 13 ton loads on average, the amount of material
delivered was 255.77 tons short of the agreed upon amount. That amount divided by 13 tons
yielded an amount of 19.67 loads short of what had been agreed to, leaving a determination
that 129 loads should have been chargedfor at $95.00 per ton. The total of$l 7,978.24 was
arrived at by adding grader time and the remainder of charges for equipment as set forth
in the trial exhibits.
26.

Butters have never been paid for the material, or the use of their equipment or

labor provided although an Offer of Judgment was made by Defendants on January 12,1999
of $20,000.00.
27.

Butters filed a lien against the subject property on February 13,1997 as filing

No. 1455231 which was recorded in Book 1847 Page 2598 in the Weber County Recorders
Office, Weber County, Utah.
28.

The parties were unable to settle the matter and on November 12,1997, Butters

filed a Lis Pendens and Complaint.
[29 - 50 contained technical findings relative to Butters compliance with the various
statutory requirements of both the mechanics' lien statute -Title 38, Chapter 1 U.C.A. and
the bonding statute - Title 14, Chapter 2 U.C.A.]
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51.

The acceptance or retention by Defendants,* and any parties claiming, by

through, or under them, under such circumstance, makes it inequitable for them to retain the
benefits conferred without payment of its value.
52.

Except as to the Counterclaim and Third-party cause of action involving the

damage to the concrete (Count 5-as to which the court found was Bovee's responsibility
through his employee Owens), no other evidence was introduced as to any of the elements
of the Third-Party Plaintiffs causes of action including damages suffered by the
CounterclaimantVThird-Party Plaintiffs as alleged in the other causes of action including
the Slander of Title (Count 2-McFarland's claim unspecified damages "damages in the
amount capable of proof at trial"); Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
(Count 3-Bovee claim for $27,000); Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
(Count 4-Holgate claim for $32,000.00).
Conclusions of Law
1.

The Plaintiff has fully complied with the legal requirements of Title 38,

Chapter 1, in connection with the filing and enforcement of the mechanics5 lien and is
entitled to an order of foreclosure in relationship to the property described above.
2.

The Defendant McFarlands failed to comply with the provisions of the Utah

Bonding Statute as set forth in Title 14, Chapter 2, and therefore the Defendant McFarlands
are personally liable to the Plaintiff for their failure to acquire and/or exhibit bond.

15

3.

The Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorney fees in connection with

pursuing its claim to enforce the mechanics' lien under the provisions of §38-1-18 U.C.A.,
which provides that the successful party in lien foreclosure action shall be awarded its
reasonable attorney fees in enforcing the lien. Said reasonable attorney fees and costs are
only to be assessed up until the time the Defendant filed their Offer ofJudgment with the
Court and the amount ofthefee awarded shall be in conformity to the Court's decision dated
August 3, 2001.
4.

Butters has a valid and subsisting lien on the Defendant's interest in the subject

property in the amount of $17,978.24 plus attorney fees and costs as of the date ofjudgment,
together with interest thereon at the legal rate accumulating as of and from the date of the
judgement.
5.

The court hereby determines the priority of said claim to be superior

6.

The Plaintiff is entitled to an order of foreclosure of the property

7.

Defendants are entitled to recover taxable costs incurred after the date oftheir

Offer ofJudgment in conforming with the court's decision dated August 3, 2001.
8.

Defendants, counterclaimants, and third-party Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory

relief (Count 1) that all that is due the Plaintiffs is the sum of $9,000.00 is denied.
9.

The McFarlands' third-party claim for slander of title (Count 2) is denied for

a lack of proof as to any of the requisite elements, including any proof of having suffered
any damages.
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10.

Bovee's third-party claim for interference with prospective economic

advantage (Count 3) is denied for a lack of proof as to any of the requisite elements,
including any proof of having suffered any damages.
11.

Holgate's third-party claim for interference with prospective economic

advantage (Count 4) is denied for a lack of proof as to any of the requisite elements,
including any proof of having suffered any damages.
12.

Defendants, counterclaimants and third-party Plaintiffs claim for damages for

breach of contract and/or breach of warranty of the compaction obligation and for damages
in the amount of $ 14,000.00+ to replace the drive-thru is denied for the reasons stated above.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's finding that the two engineering experts respective testimonies
conflicted with one another is not supported by the record. On the Contrary their testimony
simply demonstrates that they approached the problem (how much material was imported
to the site and how much is attributable to Butters) from different angles using different
methodology. Mr. Nelson testified as to the total amount of material imported to the site by
all parties. Mr. Rush testified as to the amount of material imported to the site by Butters.
There was no conflict in their respective testimony. If anything their testimony merely book
ended the issue.
The trial court's legal conclusion, i.e., that a monetary judgment which only disposes
of a portion of the pending claims, and leaves the issue of attorney fees unresolved is more
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favorable than judgment of foreclosure which includes attorney fees and dismisses the
Defendants' counterclaims and third-party claims, is legally incorrect. The trial court's
analysis failed to take into consideration: 1) attorney fees (which under the mechanics' lien
and bonding statutes are awarded as a matter of right to the successful party); 2) the
counterclaims and third-party causes of action which conservatively sought $75,000.00 in
damages; and 3) the distinction between a lien foreclosure action and an action to obtain a
monetary judgment, an important distinction recognized by the appellate courts of this state.
It was incumbent on the Defendants to make their offer clear and any ambiguity is,
as a matter of law, construed against them. If an offer is ambiguous, being capable of more
than one interpretation, the offeree is entitled to interpret the offer in light of any reasonable
meaning and should not be placed at risk of having costs assessed against them if the offer
is not reasonably clear.
Lastly the trial court, in setting the attorney fees Butters was entitled to as the
"prevailing party" under the mechanics' lien and bonding statutes, committed error when in
express contradiction to Rule 68 it utilized the offer of judgment for purposes of other than
determining entitlement to costs.

18

ARGUMENT

The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to be guided
by credible uncontradicted evidence when all other reasonable minds
would have accepted such evidence. The trial court mistakenly
concluded the unrefuted expert testimony of Butters' two civil
engineers to be in conflict.
After the parties rested, the trial court took the matter under advisement and
adjourned. Approximately (V2) one-half hour later, the trial court rendered its decision
finding that the reasonable value of the material, labor, and equipment provided by Butters
was$17,978.24.2 (Finding 25)
The trial court indicated that it used a combination of the evidence in arriving at its
decision. After reviewing the Bovee compilation (Ex. 321), the Butters' original billing (Ex.
504), and Butters' modified time cards (Ex. 504 )3, the trial court stated that the most reliable
evidence came from the Butters' unmodified time cards of 182 loads. (Video record May
9, 2001, not transcribed.)
2

The trial court's final award totaling the $17,978.24 was arrived at as follows:
$ 12,257.00

1 2 9 l o a d s X $ 9 5 . 0 0 (1,677.33 tons of material - 13 = 129 truckloads)

1,021.25
348.33
2,359.16
1,892.50
100.00
$ 17,978.24

grader time soil
grader time Bovee
grader time Butters
compactor/loader
water truck

3

Butters had attempted to determine the loads which were actually delivered to the
site as the truck drivers would mark on their time sheet both the truck and the pup (trailer)
as one load. The accounting department went back, and based on the truck and pup,
attempted to adjust for both loads.
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After deducting 7.3 loads for the bed liner in the Ford truck and deducting another 26
loads in reliance John Owens testimony, i.e., that he saw no loads delivered on Saturday,
November 16, 1996, the trial court found that Butters had delivered 148.7 loads (182 -7.3
-26 = 148.7), which on the average contained 11.28 tons or 1,677.33 tons of material.
(Finding 25)
Relying again on the testimony of John Owens, the trial court found that Butters was
obligated to deliver minimum 13-ton loads and based on the shortage of 1.72 tons per load,
(13 -11.28) she found that 1,933.1 tons should have been delivered (148.7 x 13) and that
1,677.33 tons were actually delivered (148.7 x 11.28). The trial court went on to rule that
because there was a 255.77-ton shortage (1,933.1 - 1,677.33), that another 19.67 loads
(255.77 -s-13) should be deducted for a total of 129 13-ton loads Butters had delivered. This
finding by the trial court (i.e., that 1,677.33 tons were in fact delivered by Butters) totally
disregarded the evidence presented by the expert engineering witnesses - witnesses whose
qualifications to testify at trial as engineering experts were stipulated to by the Defendants.
(Vol. Up. 89 as to Nelson and Vol Up. 145 as to Rush)
In fairness to the trial court judge, it expressed some frustration with the Butters'
records, which it found "not reliable." (Finding 24) From Butters' perspective, the most
troubling aspect of the trial court's ruling was that the trial court found the evidence
presented by the engineers to be "conflicting" and thus was totally disregarded:
23. The expert testimony of two engineers presented by Butters regarding
the amount of fill imported to the site was conflicting and not helpful to the
Court in determining the number of loads delivered by Butters to the site.
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Butters acknowledges that the trial court (particularly as a fact finder) has substantial
discretion to determine the facts. In State v. Daniels. 40 P.3d 611,617 (Utah 2002) the Utah
Supreme Court quoting from State v. Pena. 869 P. 2d 932,935 (Utah 1994) recently stated:
We generally review a trial court's findings of fact under the deferential clearly
erroneous standard. Id. at 935-36 (Utah 1994). Trial courts have primary
responsibility for making determinations of fact and must be given deference
in their factfinding role because they are in a better position to assess
credibility and determine facts than an appellate court is. Appellate courts
therefore owe broad deference to the trial court engaged in a factfinding role.
Id.
Notwithstanding that the trial court is given great deference in its fact finding
capacity, Butters' counsel respectfully submits that the trial court has no right to ignore the
expert testimony or to otherwise fail to be guided by credible uncontradicted evidence when
all reasonable minds would accept it. If this occurs, such constitutes an arbitrary and
capricious action or decision.
In the case of De Vas v. Noble. 369 P.2d 290,13 Utah 2d. 133 (Utah 1962), the Utah
Supreme Court indicated that the trial court has a substantial amount of prerogative in
weighing the evidence; however, it went on to hold that "the trial courts' prerogative does
not go so far as to permit it to stubbornly ignore or refuse to be guided by credible,
uncontradicted evidence when all reasonable minds would accept it. That could result in
arbitrary and unreasoning denial or distortion of justice."
A.

Marshaling of Evidence. Before discussing the Nelson and Rush testimonies,

Butters' counsel is mindful that he has an obligation to marshal the evidence in favor of the
courts' finding. Without attempting to shirk this responsibility, Butters' counsel would
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respectfully submit that because the trial court was very explicit in holding: " The expert
testimony of two engineers . . . regarding the amount of fill imported to the site was
conflicting . . . " that the burden is limited to demonstrating that what the two engineers
testified to did not conflict, but is easily harmonized and should have been of great value in
determining the number of loads Butters delivered to the site.
Nonetheless, Butters' attorney has thoroughly read the trial transcript, and with the
exception of the cross-examination which Defendants' counsel conducted, there is no other
evidence, expert or otherwise, which would contradict or call into question either Mr.
Nelson's engineering analysis or the core drilling and soils analysis performed by Mr. Rush.
The only testimony which would remotely come close is that of John Owens, the foreman
who the trial court found was hired by Mr. Bovee to bring the site to an asphalt-ready stage.
The trial court relied upon this testimony tofindthat 26 loads of material were not delivered
on Saturday, November 26,1996, as claimed by Butters. However, this testimony does not
refute the testimony of Mr. Nelson that there had been 61,122 cubic feet of material
delivered to the site (of which Bovee can only account for 146 truckloads). The testimonies
of Merv Holgate and Tim Bovee do not rebut or refute in any respect Mr. Nelson's or Mr.
Rush's testimony, but simply focuses on compaction and other issues in relationship to the
contract between Butters and Bovee.
The testimony of Abe Martinez fails to refute either Mr. Nelson's or Mr. Rush's
testimony. Again, although the Defendants use a different proctor in determining the
number of truckloads of material which were delivered, they adopted the testimony of Scott
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Nelson. ( Ex. 321) (Ex. 321 acknowledges that at least 293 13-ton truckloads of material
were delivered to the site. Even taking Bovee's 293 13-ton truckloads and deducting the 146
Bovee claims to have imported, this still would leave Butters with entitlement to 147 (293 146) loads, or $13,965.00.
B.

Evidence of Loads Delivered to Site. From the outset Butters knew that the

Defendants were disputing the accuracy of the drivers' time sheets on which the loads
delivered were recorded. In order to persuade the Defendants that they had imported the
amount of material which they had invoiced, Butters dug test holes (Shell test holes - Vol.
II, p. 148) around the perimeter of the site and measured the depth of the materials (Ex.
507). Defendants were unconvinced. As a consequence, Butters felt that the most credible
evidence would be to retain professional civil engineers to determine scientifically how
much material had been imported to the site and what portion could be attributed to Butters.
This was possible because prior to any construction (and the importation of any materials)
a pre-construction site survey with known elevations had been prepared. (See Ex. 509)
Consequently, with an "as built" topographical survey one could mathematically determine
the total amount of material imported to the site.
In order to understand how disparate the trial court's finding that only 129 loads of
material were imported to the site by Butters viz-a-viz the expert testimony of the two civil
engineers, one must first understand the formula which the expert witnesses were using to
convert cubic feet and cubic yards of material to tonnage of material. The formula to
undertake the necessary conversions are set forth below:

23

Formula:
Cubic yards x 27 = Cubic feet of material
Cubic feet x proctor = Pounds of material
Pounds of material -s- 2,000 = Tons of material

Example of formula:
2,263.78 cu. yds. x 27 =61,122
61,122 cu. ft. x 137.8 = 8,422,611
8,422,611 lbs. * 2,000 = 4,211.31

Tons of material -s-13 (tons) = Truckloads

4,211.31 tons -s-13 = 324 truckloads

(Testimony of Scott Nelson, Vol. II, pp. 106-113)
C.

Scott Nelson's Testimony - Total Amount of Material Imported to Site by

All Parties Determined by Topographical Survey. Scott Nelson testified as to the total
amount of material imported to the site by both Bovee and Butters. After explaining the
methodology he employed to obtain the datum from his "as built" topographical survey of
the site, Scott Nelson, a civil engineer with 20 years of experience (Vol. II, p. 126, line 10),
testified that in his opinion a total of 61.122 cubic feet of material had been imported to the
site bv all parties. (Vol. II, p. 112-See also Ex. 511 A, 51 IB, 511C, and 51 ID.)
Below (converted to truckloads) is the total amount ofmaterial which was imported
to the site, based on the various proctors4 as testified by Scott Nelson and Alex Rush.
Cubic feet 61,122
61,122
Proctor
133
135
Pounds 8,129,226 8,251,470
Tons
4,064.6
4,125.74
Truckloads
313
317
(based on 13 ton loads)

61,122
137.8
8,422,612
4,211.31
324

61,122
145
8,862,690
4431.35
341

"Proctor refers to the weight of the material. (Vol. II, p. 222) Both expert witnesses
testified as to the proctor of the material. Exhibit 511 prepared by Scott Nelson used a
proctor of 137.8. (Vol. II, p. 112) Scott Nelson testified that Butters' material had a proctor
of between 135 and 145 (Vol. II, pp. 111-3). Alex Rush testified that the proctor of the
material was not less than 133 pounds per ton and likely was greater. One hundred fortyseven (147) is the proctor for course natural pit run which is what Butters' material is
classified as. (Vol II, p. 248, line 14-23)
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The above figures reflect the total truckloads of material imported to the site by all
parties. As stated above Scott Nelson testified as to the total amount of material imported
to the site by both Bovee and Butters. In order to determine the amount of material delivered
by Butters, one would only have to subtract the amount of loads that Bovee claims to have
delivered to the site. (146 loads-See Ex. 321) The simplicity of Nelson's approach is that
it is simply a volume analysis based on the specific material (dirt) imported to the site. It
recognizes the fact that the site has been raised to its current the level, a fact which cannot
be denied, whether or not one or more witnesses saw or did not see loads delivered on a
specific date or whether Butters' time sheets were or were not accurate. Giving full credit
to the loads that Bovee claims to have imported to the site, from a mathematical and civil
engineering perspective the only other way the site could be at the current level is if Butters
had, in fact, delivered at least 167 tol95 13-ton loads (313-146 or 341-146). This is simply
a function of volume and mathematics with known beginning and ending values.
D.

Alex Rush's Testimony • Amount of Material Imported to Site (Parking

Lot and Roadway) by Butters Determined by Analysis of Core Drillings. Alex Rush,
a civil engineer with 20 years of experience, (Vol II, p. 178) testified that based upon his
investigation, between 38,020 to 39.025 of cubic feet of material had been imported to the
site by Butters. Below (converted to 13-ton truckloads) is the amount of Butters' material
which Mr. Rush determined Butters had imported to the site:
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Cubic feet
38,020
39,015
38,020
39,015
Proctor
133
133
137.8
137.8
Pounds
5,056,660 5,188,995
5,239,156
5,376,267
Tons
2,528.33
2,594.5
2,619.5
2,688.1
Truckloads
194.5
199.5
201.5
206.75
(based on 13 ton loads)
E.

Comparison of Experts with Trial Courts9 Finding. A comparison of the

expert witnesses' testimonies viz a viz the judge's findings is set forth below. Note all
figures reflect 13-ton truckloads:
Judge Heffernan's Finding
129 Truckloads

F.

Rush's Testimony
194 - 207 truckloads

Nelson's Testimony
313-341 truckloads
-146 Bovee loads
167-195 Butters

The Evidence is Not in Conflict. It is respectfully submitted that the trial

court misapprehended the expert testimonies offered by the two civil engineers. Each expert
approached the problem using a different methodology, and each gave an opinion that would
be of value to the fact finder. No testimony was offered to refute or rebut their opinions.
Granted the testimonies did not dovetail with one another; they were not intended to. They
did, however, bookend each other's conclusions, and each accounted for the loads which
Butters claimed were imported to the site.
Mr. Rush testified that he located material consistent with Butters pit run that was
imported to the site - all from one source. (Vol. II, p. 172, p. 182) (the understood
implication at trial was that source was Butters' pit) in the range of 38,020 and 39,015 cubic
feet. (Vol. II, p. 175, p. 219)
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The trial court found the expert testimony was in conflict. In this regard, Butters
respectfully submits the trial court misunderstood that Mr. Nelson was testifying to the total
amount of material which was imported to the site (by all parties), and that Mr. Rush was
testifying (based on his analysis and methodology) about the total amount of materials which
came from one source, and that source was consistent with the material from Butters' pit.
(Vol. II, p. 167) The trial court evidently expected both experts to testify as to the same
amount, and the court apparently became confused when the experts (instead of testifying
as to the same figure) approached the problem from two completely different angles (Mr.
Nelson determining all material imported to the site and Mr. Rush focusing on determining
what Butters had imported to the site) and used completely different methodologies.
Based upon the pre-construction site survey and the known elevations prior to
construction (Ex. 509), Mr. Nelson was able to survey the site and with his "as built" survey
datum, he was able to mathematically determine that the total amount of material imported
to the site was 61,122 cubic feet.
Mr. Rush, on the other hand, utilized a totally different methodology. Based upon his
engineering experience and training, his approach was to "core drill" the site. Mr. Rush
determined that the total amount of material attributed to one source (which was most similar
to Butters' material) imported to the site was between 38,070 - 39,015 cubic feet of material.
In addition, Mr. Rush testified that the material which he analyzed, based on the core
drilling, was in fact imported from the same source and was not of the consistency of the
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sandy material which Mr. Bovee claimed to have imported to the site. (Compare Ex. 513
and Ex. 514.)
Even assuming that all of the trucks delivering material to the site carried 13 tons (the
minimum tonnage which the court found Butters had contracted to deliver to the site), given
the scientific testimony of Scott Nelson this would require approximately 324 truckloads of
material which had been imported to the site. (This also assumes that the material had
approximately the same proctor of 137.8. Even assuming a proctor of only 135, this would
still account for 317 truckloads of material.)
The trial court'sfindingthat only 1,677.33 tons of material was delivered by Butters,
which accounts for only 129 -13 ton loads, logically fails to recognize that with the site at
the current height (compared with the pre-construction topographical site survey - Ex. 509)
then either someone mysteriously imported material or Butters was not given credit for the
material it did, in fact, import to the site.
One of the ironies of the trial is that the trial court'sfinding(of the material delivered
by Butters) ignores not only the engineering experts' testimonies but also the fact that even
the Defendants agreed with Scott nelson's approach. See Defendant's Exhibit 321. The
Defendants impliedly acquiesced that Scott Nelson's testimony was the single most
important evidence available as to the amount of material imported to the site. (It is
submitted that they did so based upon the accuracy of the methodology which he employed.)
In Defendant's Exhibit 321, the Defendants acknowledge that there have been, exclusive of
the front planter box, the building foot print and the landscaping area, 2010 cubic yards of
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material or 54,207 cubic feet of material imported to the site. (This exhibit not only adopts
in total Scott Nelson's testimony but then addresses the material underneath the building and
the landscaping area, which accounts for the other 6,800 cubic feet of material, totaling the
61,122 cubic feet of material to which Mr. Nelson testified to - 54,207 + 6,800 = 61,122.)
The problem with the court's finding of only 129 13 ton loads having been delivered
by Butters is that it fails to account for the site having been raised to the level it currently is
at. Even accounting for all of the loads which Bovee claims to have delivered to the site,
there are still approximately 38-66 loads of material which exist on the site which Butters
claim to have delivered and which Bovee does not claim to have delivered. The court's
findings totally ignore the fact that the site has been raised to a certain level and fails to
account for how the site was raised to that level. The 167-195 loads would have a value of
$15,865.00 - $16,525.00, which would make the other issues in relationship to the Offer of
Judgment (discussed below) irrelevant.
The trial court's deduction of 26 loads (having a value of $2,470.00) is simply not
supported by the scientific and engineering evidence. Otherwise, the site could not have
been raised to the level at which it currently exists. The material did not appear by itself.
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II
A monetary "offer of judgment" (particularly one that only
partially disposes of the pending claims) is not more favorable than a
judgment of foreclosure, which grants foreclosure of the mechanics'
lien with a priority from the date materials were first delivered to the
property, includes attorney fees, and disposes of all of the remaining
claims. The trial court erred in awarding the Defendants their costs
of court incurred after making their Offer of Judgment as the Offer of
Judgment was not, as a matter of law, more favorable than the
judgment finally obtained by Butters.

Rule 68 U.R.C.P. in pertinent part provides as follows:
(b) Offer Before Trial. At any time more than 10 days before the trial
begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an
offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money or property or
to the effect specified in his offer\ with costs then accrued. If within 10 days
after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the
offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance
together with proof of service thereof and thereupon judgment shall be
entered. An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence
thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the
judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer,
the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. The fact
that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer.
(Emphasis supplied by the Appellant)
The Offer of Judgment made by the Defendants states the following:
"Comes now the above named Defendants by and through their attorney of
record and tenders to this Court an offer ofjudgment, pursuant to Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 68. There is in dispute the amount due and owing on
a verbal construction contract. Under the terms of that contract there was no
provision for attorney's fees. However, the Defendants are mindful of the
claim for attorney's fees being made against the Defendant McFarland.
Inasmuch as this case can and might accrue significant attorneys fees and
costs, and inasmuch as the Defendants are desirous of curbing those potential
fees and costs, the Defendants are tendering the following offer, which
includes costs, but does not include attorney's fees. The issue of fees can still
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be presented to the Court for a final determination. The offer being tendered
by the Defendants is Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00).
DATED: January 12th, 1999." (Record 288-291) (Emphasisprovided by the
Appellant)
A.

The Offer of Judgment was Ambiguous, The primary purpose of an Offer

of Judgment is to encourage settlements and avoid protracted litigation. Delta Air Lines v.
August. 101 S. Ct. 1146 (1981) citing Moores Federal Practice. Butters would respectfully
suggest that Rule 68 contemplates a global settlement. In this case, the Offer of Judgment
was ambiguous5 (i.e., an offer capable of more than one meaning) and as a matter of law, any
such ambiguity in the offer must be construed against the drafter. Did the Offer of Judgment
include the dismissal of the counterclaims and third-party claims? Butters did not know if
it did or did not, a strict interpretation of the offer would be no. Did the Defendants intend
the judgment to relate back to the date of the lien or only from the date the offer was
accepted and judgment eventually entered? It is not known. Was the offeree conceding that
since the underlying claims (mechanics' lien statute and bonding statute) allowed for
attorney fees that trial court should award attorney fees incurred to the date of the offer of
judgment? Unlikely, if this was the case, they could have clearly stated such. (More likely
the offer was a potential trap to prevent attorney fees from being recovered - see discussion

"A contract is ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, has multiple meanings,
or is not plain to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding. See id.
at 1274-75; Nielsen, 848 P.2d at 666. Ambiguities are construed against the
drafter... SeeAlf, 850 P.2d at 1274; Nielsen, 848 P.2d at 666." Utah Farm
Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook 980P.2d 685, 686-687 (Utah 1999)
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below.) Whatever can be said of the Offer of Judgment, it was not a global settlement or an
offer that would have resulted in the avoidance of protracted litigation as the issue of
attorney fees and the $75,000.00 in counterclaims and third-party claims were left
unresolved and would have to be litigated.
Since the Defendants' attorney prepared the offer, if there is any question as to what
Defendants intended it must be construed against them. See Aikens v. Ludlum ,113 N.C.
App. at 826,440 S.E.2d at 321. Any ambiguity in the offer must be construed against the
drafter. Id. at 826-7,440 S.E.2d at 322; see also Hicks v. Albertson. 284 N.C. 236,241,200
S.E.2d 40, 43 (1973) ("If this was not the interpretation intended by the defendant, the
misunderstanding is due to ambiguous language used by the defendant in making his offer
and the defendant must bear any loss resulting therefrom.'1)
B.

The Judgment (of Foreclosure) Obtained Following Trial Is More

Favorable than the Offer of Judgment

The question on its face appears to be a

straightforward proposition: Is a $20,000.00 monetary judgment as of January 12, 1999
(with unresolved issues as to who, if anyone, is entitled to attorney fees and unresolved
issues as to the counterclaims and third-party causes of action) more favorable than the result
which Butters obtained following trial? Because the Defendants' offer is ambiguous, it is
difficult to know exactly which aspects or components of the pending action to place in the
balance to determine whether the Offer of Judgment was less favorable or more favorable
than the final judgment.
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The judgment obtained following trial had several components:
1) an Order of Foreclosure with respect to the mechanics' lien;
2) an award of costs;
3) an award of attorney fees to be taxed as costs in the matter;
4) a personal judgment on the bonding statute6 cause of action; and
5) lastly, a complete dismissal of the counterclaims and third-party causes of
actions conservatively totaling $75-100,000.00.
Rule 68(b) U.R.C.P. requires the trial court to analyze and account for each of these
components-including the significant differences between a monetary judgment and an
order of foreclosure. Because there are important fundamental differences between these
two types of judgments, the issue determined by the trial court required a legal analysis
which was more complex than simply comparing numbers. Given a strict interpretation of
the offer, Butters would respectfully submit the proper comparison would graphically be
represented as follows:

The bonding statute is an auxiliary to the mechanics1 lien statute. Recovery
on a mechanics' lien claim does not prevent recovery on the bonding statute
claim as well. See King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co.. 13 Utah 2d 339,
341, 374 P.2d 254, 255-56 (1962); Rio Grande Lumber v. Darke. 50 Utah
114,124,167 P. 241,245 (1917). See also Bailev-Allen Co.. Inc. v. Kurzet.
876 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah App. 1994). (When determining whether attorney
fees should be awarded under the bond statute, the trial court should consider
precedent treating the Bond Statute as auxiliary to the mechanics1 lien statute
and as sharing with it a common purpose.)
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Offer of Judgment
$20,000.00 Monetary Judgment
Priority as of date judgment entered
Attorney fees issue left unresolved
Count I -$9,755.00 Declaratory
Judgment claim left unresolved
Count II - Open-ended Slander
of Title claim left unresolved
Count III - $27,000.00 Interference with
Bovee Economic Advantage left unresolved
Count IV - $32,000.00 Interference with
Holgate Economic Advantage left unresolved
Count V - $20,000.00 Punitive Damage
claim left unresolved

Results Obtained Following Trial
$ 17,978.74 Judgment of Foreclosure
Priority as of date first labor or materials
$7,751.21
Count I - Dismissed
Count II - Open ended claim dismissed
Count III - $27,000.00 dismissed
Count IV - $32,000.00 dismissed
Count V - $20,000.00 dismissed

Even though the trial court acknowledged that a portion of the property in question
had been transferred after the lien had been filed (Record 737) and that the judgment of
foreclosure would be of greater value relating back to the lien date rather than the judgment
date, the trial court focused only on the first component (dollar value) and made a simple
comparison of $20,000.00 versus $17,978.74. This approach is too simplistic given the
language mandated by Rule 68. Rule 68 requires the court to perform an analysis of the
entire results obtained after trial and compare that with the Offer of Judgment; one cannot
simply pick and chose components of the dispute to compare. If the total result following
trial is more favorable, then, and only then, is the offeree entitled to recover their post Offer
of Judgment costs of court. In this instance the trial court felt that allowing the Defendants
to obtain their post-offer costs furthered the purpose of Rule 68, i.e., to encourage settlement
and avoid protracted litigation. (Record 737) However, in this case, it is respectfully
submitted that the trial court's ruling allows a party to circumvent the very purpose of Rule
68. Rule 68 was designed to put an end to the litigation, not chose bits and pieces and then
having obtained a result in a portion of the litigation more favorable than the other party in
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a portion of the litigation be allowed to claim that they are entitled to their post Offer of
Judgment costs. Where is the fairness in that result?
Butters eventually obtained a judgment of foreclosure, exclusive of costs, of
$25,729.95 ($17,978.74 plus $7,751.21 attorney fees to the date of the Offer of Judgment).
The trial court failed to take into consideration Butters' attorney fees incurred up to the date
of the Offer of Judgment. It is respectfully submitted that because the attorney fees in a lien
foreclosure action are statutorily mandated to the "successful party" that the trial court
committed error in failing to consider them as an integral aspect of result obtained viz-a-viz
the Offer of Judgment. Properly framed, the question the trial court needed to answer was:
Was the judgment of foreclosure finally obtained by Butters (the offeree) more favorable
than the monetary offer made by the Defendants? Unless one is familiar with construction
law matters, particularly mechanics' lien law, one's initial impression may be no; however
this would be incorrect.
The Defendants' Offer of Judgment was for the sum of $20,000.00. It included
costs7, but excluded attorney fees, which the Defendants expressly reserved to be presented
"to the court for afinaldetermination." (Record 229-241) The offer is unambiguous to the
extent that it is only an offer for a monetary judgment. (It did not offer to allow the entry of
an order of foreclosure relative to the mechanics' lien claim.) The offer, however, was
7

Under the rationale of the Aikens v. Ludlum decision, infra, it could be argued
that the Defendants' Offer of Judgment was ambiguous in this respect. The
Aikens court held the phrase "together with costs accrued" was ambiguous as
to whether the "costs accrued" were included in the $45,001.00 figure or
whether the costs were left to be separately determined by the court.
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incomplete and ambiguous to the extent that it did not address either the Defendants'
counterclaims or the third-party causes of actions. Because of these ambiguities the answer
to the question may be that it is too complex for a court to make a meaningful analysis or
comparison to answer the question.
C.

The Defendants' Offer of Judgment was a "Trojan Horse" Offer!

Whether the Defendants' intended their Offer of Judgment to be ambiguous, it contained
a potential trap as it relates to the issue of attorney fees in a mechanics' lien case. Those
familiar with Utah construction law, particularly mechanics' lien claims, can see the latent
ambiguity of the offer. In order to be entitled to attorney fees, Butters must "successfully
enforce the lien." See Reeves v. Steinfeldt. 915 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Utah Ct. App.1996);
Palombi v. D & C Builders. 22 Utah 2d 297, 300-01, 452 P.2d 325, 327-28 (1969).
Conversely if Butters fails to obtain an order of foreclosure which is necessary to enforce the
lien, Defendants are entitled to attorney fees. Kurth v.Wiarda. 991 P.2d 1113 (Utah App.
1999).
What exactly did the Defendants intend when they stated: "The issue of fees can still
be presented to the Court for a final determination?" Again, any attorney familiar with
mechanics' lien claims, knows that a monetary Offer of Judgment does not get you attorney
fees. See AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development and Energy Co./714 P.2d 289, 293
(Utah 1986) where the court awarded attorney fees against the plaintiff (mechanics' lien
claimant) who failed to obtain an order of foreclosure with respect to its lien.
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Had Butters accepted the offer of a monetary judgment, it would not under Utah law
have been entitled to "successful party" status, and thus would not have been entitled to any
award for attorney fees under §38-1-18 U.C. A. On the contrary, the Defendants could then
rightfully claim that since all that Butters obtained was a monetary judgment they were the
"successful party" with respect to the lien foreclosure cause of action, c.f, Kurth v.Wiarda.
991 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1999). (When Wiarda, a mechanics' lien claimant, failed to
obtain an Order of Foreclosure with respect to his lien, the award of attorney fees against
him was mandatory.) See also Reeves v. Steinfeldt 915 P.2d 1073 (Utah App. 1996) which
held:
Section 38-1-18 provides in part, "in any action to enforce any lien
under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable
attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the
action." Id. (emphasis added). The language of this statute is mandatory,
not discretionary, see Richards v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 849 P.2d 606,
612 (Utah App. 1993) (awarding attorney fees on appeal), thus an award of
reasonable attorney fees is appropriate. We therefore remand this case to the
trial court for an award of such fees. (Excerpt from page 1079 - emphasis
provided by Appellant)
Assuming that the attorney fees incurred by the Defendants up to the Offer of
Judgment were similar to Butters (approximately $7,750.00), then in order to compare the
Offer of Judgment (as of the date of the Offer of Judgment) you would have to include in the
analysis the respective parties' attorney fees. Depending on the type of case involved, the
inclusion of attorney fees may or may not be required. However, because they are awarded
to the "successful party" as a matter of statutory right, once a lien foreclosure claim is made
and would therefore reduce Butters' award if it had accepted the offer for a monetary
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judgment, the proper comparison must be based upon the inclusion of attorney fees,
otherwise the court is ignoring the underlying nature of a mechanics5 lien cause of action
which this case was:
Offer of Judgment
Less Attorney Fees

$20,000.00
-$ 7.750.00

Judgment Obtained
Attorney Fees

$ 17,978.74
+$7.751.21

Net Amount

$12,250.00

Net Amount

$25,729.95

Because the Defendants chose to word their offer in the manner they did, the judgment of
foreclosure obtained by Butters was more favorable than the offer of a monetary judgment
made by the Defendants.
Butters firmly believe the Defendants intended this consequence8 because the offer
was very carefully worded and intentionally left ambiguous in this regard. The courts should
not sanction any attempt to trick or allow a party to gain a tactical advantage over another
party and then allow that party to claim or represent that the offer was something other than
what it was. This is simply estoppel inpias in its most simple application.
Had the Plaintiff accepted the Defendants' Offer of Judgment (which provided only
for a monetary judgment and expressly reserved the issue of attorney fees yet to be
determined by the court), then the issue of attorney fees would have been resolved in the
Defendants' favor. The Plaintiff would not have been successful in obtaining an Order of

8

Butters' assertion that the Defendants' attorney intentionally and very
carefully crafted the offer to be a "Trojan Horse" offer is not based on
speculation or paranoia. Taking into consideration the carefully worded Offer
of Judgment and Defendants' post trial motion seeking attorney fees, it is
evident that the Defendants were attempting to lay a trap by vaguely wording
the offer and reserving the attorney fees issue to the court.
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Foreclosure of the lien, and the Defendants would then be able to claim that they had
successfully defended against the lien foreclosure action. Consequently, they would have
been entitled under §38-1-18 U.C.A. to their attorney fees.

Kurth v. Wiarda. supra.

Because of this potential trap, the Defendants' Offer of Judgment was not accepted. The
trial court dismissed this concern and stated that Rule 68 contemplates that a party making
an offer does so in "good faith." (Record 737)
With all due respect, such legal platitudes are easy to pronounce, particularly with
20/20 hindsight. However, it ignores the overriding legal principle that if an offer is
ambiguous it is to be construed against the drafter. Had Butters' counsel advised accepting
the offer of a monetary judgment and then been faced with the argument that without an
order of foreclosure he was not the successful party, there is no legal principle allowing
rescission of Butters' acceptance based upon a unilateral mistake. (No matter how strongly
the trial court feels about "good faith" and "fairness" the offeree is still placed in the position
of having to second guess what the Defendant's Rule 68 offer encompasses and more
importantly an allegation of malpractice.) Having then relied upon an interpretation that
appears reasonable, Butters is faced with the prospect of having fees awarded against them
(having taken the offer, but failed to obtain a judgment of foreclosure) or in the alternative
be assessed costs for having failed to interpret the Offer of Judgment in the same manner that
the trial court in 20/20 hindsight does. This is the primary reason the courts have universally
required that offers of judgment be construed against the drafter if there is any ambiguity,
i.e., to prevent a party from maintaining duplicitous positions.
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A fortiori, given the significant fundamental differences between a monetary
judgment and an order of foreclosure (particularly where the Defendants' Offer of Judgment
was only a monetary judgment of $20,000.00, inclusive of costs, but exclusive of attorney
fees - thus exposing Butters to an award of attorney fees in favor of the Defendants, while
not resolving the counterclaims or the third-party causes of actions) is there any real question
that the result obtained at trial was significantly "more favorable" than the consequences
which would have resulted had the Plaintiff accepted the $20,000.00 amount offered under
the January 12,1999, Offer of Judgment? The Defendants simply cannot have it both ways,
and any ambiguities in their offer must be construed against them.
D.

The Relation Back Component to the Foreclosure Judgment

The

Judgment of Foreclosure finally obtained by the Plaintiff (the Offeree) was far more
favorable than the monetary offer made by the Defendants. In order to understand why the
Defendants' offer was less advantageous, one needs to understand and appreciate the
fundamental differences between simply obtaining a monetary judgment versus obtaining
an order foreclosing the mechanics' lien. A monetary judgment (which is what the
Defendants' Offer of Judgment was) becomes a lien against the property owned by the
Judgment Debtors as of the date of the judgment is docketed. §78-22-1 U.C. A. It does not
relate back to the lien date in any fashion. An order foreclosing the lien relates back to the
date the first work was performed on the property by any contractor, subcontractor, or
materialman. See §38-1-5 U.C.A.; Duckettv.Olsen. 699 P2d. 734 (Utah 1985). A monetary
judgment thus can affect only the persons against whom the judgment is entered, whereas
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an order foreclosing the lien can affect any person who in the interim has either purchased
or acquired a security interest in the property on which the lien was filed. In the case of a
monetary judgment, a lender or buyer could acquire a superior position in the property if the
monetary judgment was obtained after the security interest or sale was recorded. In Contrast,
if an order of foreclosure is obtained, any loan or sale made after work was first performed
on the property would be junior to the mechanic lien being foreclosed under the Order of
Foreclosure. These are very important distinctions, particularly in this case, because as the
evidence at trial established, the larger portion of the property (all of the roadway and all of
the property laying east and north of roadway) which the lien encompasses has been sold to
a third party (who was not a party to the action), but upon whom the order of foreclosure is
binding. If the Defendants' Offer of Judgment had been accepted, then the portion of the
property sold to this person would not be subject to the Order of Foreclosure, whereas with
an Order of Foreclosure, even this portion of the property will be subject to the court's
decree.
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III.

The trial court erred when it limited Butters' attorney fees to the
amount it incurred pre Offer of Judgment, particularly when the trial court
did such in contradiction of the express language of Rule 68.
The trial court determined that Butters was the "prevailing party" and was entitled to
an award of attorney fees. (Record 737) However, as a matter of law,9 the trial court limited
Butters to the attorney fees incurred pre Offer of Judgment.
Irrespective of what this court does with the previous issues, Butters submits it was
error for the trial court to limit its recovery to only the pre Offer of Judgment fees for two
reasons:
1) Such is contrary to the express language of Rule 68; and
2) Such is expressly contrary to the legislative intent and purpose of §3 8-1 -18 U.C. A.,
then in effect.
A. Such Is Contrary to the Express Language of Rule 68.
Rule 68 (b) U.R.C.P. specifically instructs the trial court to disregard the Offer of
Judgment except to determine costs. Rule 68(b) provides in pertinent part: " . . . An offer
not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a

9

The pertinent portion of Conclusion of Law No. 3 provides: Said reasonable
attorney fees and costs are only to be assessed up until the time the Defendant filed their
Offer of Judgment with the Court and the amount of the fee awarded shall be in conformity
to the Court's decision dated August 3, 2001. It is clear from the way in which the trial
court phrased this Conclusion that it was limiting the fees not based upon a finding that this
amount was all that was reasonable, but on its legal conclusion that this is all that the law
allowed.
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proceeding to determine costs...." In relationship to the issue of attorney fees, Rule 68
mandates that the fact the Defendants made an Offer of Judgment is irrelevant, including any
endeavor by the Defendants to make an end run around the plain meaning of §38-1-18
U.C.A. Any other attempt to interject it into the proceedings or for the trial court to use such
as a basis to limit fees or use it in any manner, other than to determine costs, is improper.
Therefore, except for the matter of costs, it should have been a complete non factor for all
other purposes of the litigation, including the determination of the amount of attorney fees
that Butters was entitled to.
The trial court did not disregard the offer (as it should have) and in setting the amount
of attorney fees, limited Butters to those fees incurred pre Offer of Judgment. It is
interesting to note that §38-1-18 U.C.A. was amended (effective April 30,2001) to allow the
court to do exactly what it did. However, this was not the law in effect at the time of trial,
and it was error for the trial court to disregard the express language of Rule 68 and §38-1-18
U.C.A. and in contravention of Rule 68 limit Butters' attorney fees to those incurred prior
to the Offer of Judgment.
B. Such Is Expressly Contrary to the Legislative Intent and Purpose of §38-1-18
U.C.A. Then in Effect As noted above, §38-1-18 U.C.A. (in effect April 30, 2001)
provides for precisely the same result that Judge Heffernan reached. Why then should this
court overturn her decision?
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The fact that the legislature had to change the law to obtain that result should in and
of itself be irrefutable and conclusive that the trial court's ruling was contrary to the law in
effect at the time of the trial. (Otherwise, why did they have to change it?)
The trial court expressed frustration with the fact that both parties had incurred
significant attorney fees trying to resolve this dispute. Obviously, the decision (Record 737)
to limit Butters' attorney fees reflects the trial court's belief that, in part, this was the result
of Butters' failure to accept the Offer of Judgment. However, the trial court also recognized
that at first the Defendants denied altogether the validity of Butters mechanics' lien or that
they were entitled to any amount of recovery. Later, Defendants' changed their position to
one where they acknowledged Butters were entitled to approximately $9,000.00 for the
improvements made to the property. (Record 73 7) It did not escape the trial court's attention
that even though an undisputed sum of $9,000.00 was acknowledged as being due, the
Defendants never tendered the undisputed amount thereby forcing Butters to pursue the lien
foreclosure action to a conclusion. What the trial court failed to mention, however, (but
which is apparent from the file) is that from the outset, Bovee, Holgate, and McFarland
retaliated against Butters by filing over $75,000.00 of counterclaims and third-party claims.
In light of the Defendant's complete failure to even introduce any evidence on these claims
(which were all dismissed), it is obvious that the only reason Defendants filed these claims
in thefirstplace was to put Butters at risk for pursuing their lien claim. As a result, Butters
were required to proceed to trial and recovered almost twice the undisputed sum. (Record
737)
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Under the circumstance, Butters respectfully submits that it is not only unfair to
Butters from a due process (notice) perspective to limit their fees, but that given the thenversion of §38-1-18 U.C.A., it was contrary to the then legislature's intent as well as this
Court's decision in A.K. & R Whipple v. Guv, 47 P.3d 92 (Utah App. 2002) which adopted
a "prevailing party" analysis specifically requiring the trial court, in making an award of
attorney fees, to take into consideration the fact that Butters prevailed on the $75,000.00
worth of counterclaims and third-party claims. By limiting attorney fees to only the preOffer of Judgment, i.e., the trial court erred in applying the "prevailing party" standard this
Court adopted A. K. & R. Whipple v. Guy, supra.
Due Process. Since this case arose prior to the enactment of §38-1-18 U.C.A.
effective April 30, 2001, how would Butters (and Butters' counsel) be on notice that their
failure to accept the January 1999 Offer of Judgment would have the effect of limiting the
amount of attorney fees they would be entitled to, particularly in light of Rule 68 which
indicates that such a result is contrary to Rule 68. Nothing prior to the enactment of §38-118 U.C.A. effective April 2001 (not any case or Rule 68 itself) could have put Butters on
notice of the result the trial court reached, which, as a matter of law was contrary to the
express language of both Rule 68 and §38-1-18 U.C.A., then in effect.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's finding that the two engineering experts respective testimonies
conflicted with one another is not supported by the record. On the Contrary their testimony
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simply demonstrates that they approached the problem (how much material was imported
to the site and how much is attributable to Butters) from different angles using different
methodology. Mr. Nelson testified as to the total amount of material imported to the site by
all parties. Mr. Rush testified as to the amount of material imported to the site by Butters.
There was no conflict in their respective testimony. If anything their testimony merely book
ended the issue.
Given the significant fundamental differences between a monetary judgment and an
order of foreclosure, there is no question that the result obtained at trial was significantly
"more favorable" than the consequences which would have resulted had Butters accepted
the $20,000.00 offer. The Defendants' Offer of Judgment was only a monetary judgment,
inclusive of costs, but exclusive of attorney fees, and thus exposed the Plaintiff to an award
of attorney fees in favor of the Defendants, while not resolving any of the pending
counterclaims or the third-party causes of actions seeking damages conservatively in the
range of $75,000.00. The result following trial included not only an order of foreclosure of
the mechanics' lien, but also a judgment against the property owners under the bonding
statute and the dismissal of the Defendants' counterclaims and the related third-party causes
of actions. The Defendants' offer was not more favorable than the results Butters obtained
following trial, and no attempt to massage the facts could ever result in a rational conclusion
that it was more favorable.
Rule 68 (b) U.R.C.P. expressly provides that an Offer of Judgment in any event is
only relevant for determining costs, not attorney fees. For the reasons stated above, Butters
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respectfully submits the trial courts' Conclusion of Law, limiting attorney fees to just the
amount incurred pre Offer of Judgment was error.
Butters would respectfully request that the Court of Appeals reverse and remand with
instructions to allow Butters their costs and their full reasonable attorney fees and to take
into consideration the testimony of the two engineering experts or in the alternative remand
for a new trial as to the issue of the amount of material imported to the site by Butters.
In addition, because this matter involves a mechanics lien, Butters would request that
the Court of Appeals enter as part of its decision that Butters is entitled to its reasonable
attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of June, 2003.
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